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Abstract 
 
We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final 
output) among firms in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information 
sharing generally leads to increases in expected total welfare but may reduce expected 
firm profits. Even when expected firm profits increase, information sharing does not 
represent equilibrium behavior because firms face a prisoner’s dilemma in which it is 
privately rational for each firm to withhold information, given that other firms report 
truthfully. This equilibrium can be overcome if firms commit to simultaneously reporting 
their information and if reports are verifiable. We argue that agricultural bargaining 
associations serve both these roles.  
 
Keywords: agricultural markets, bargaining, imperfect competition, information 
sharing 
 
 
  
 
 
INFORMATION SHARING AND OLIGOPOLY  
IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS:  THE ROLE OF 
BARGAINING ASSOCIATIONS 
 
 
Introduction 
Many markets for farm output are plausibly characterized by some degree of 
imperfect competition. This is certainly true in most fruit and vegetable markets where 
growers are numerous, and where intermediation (e.g., processing or shipping/packing) is 
relatively concentrated. Processing or packing cooperatives, and cooperative bargaining 
among farmers, may in some instances be institutional responses to these market 
imperfections—in both cases, farmers can enhance their bargaining position in price 
negotiations with noncooperative intermediaries (e.g., Sexton 1990). This perspective 
emphasizes the effect of cooperation on the distribution of surplus among participants in 
agricultural markets. An alternative view—the one we explore in this paper—is that 
cooperation is an institutional response affecting the efficiency of market transactions and 
hence indirectly the distribution of surplus among parties.  
Briefly, we consider an imperfectly competitive market for farm output in which 
information sharing among intermediaries (about uncertain future demand for final 
output) potentially leads to higher expected aggregate surplus. In this context, we show 
that a bargaining association can solve a prisoner’s dilemma among firms where all 
parties (firms, consumers, and growers) are better off when information is fully shared, 
but where each firm’s dominant strategy is to not reveal its information. The bargaining 
association serves two roles. First, it invests costly resources in verification of firm 
reports (firms can choose not to reveal their information, but if they do reveal, it is 
impossible to lie), and second, it provides a mechanism by which all parties commit to 
simultaneously revealing their information. We will argue that these two functions are 
reasonable descriptions of what bargaining associations actually do (among other things), 
and that they serve to solve the prisoner’s dilemma.  
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In what follows, we begin with a description of bargaining in agricultural markets. 
We then develop a model of information sharing based on the work of Vives (1984), 
Raith (1996), and Li (1985) (see Vives 1999, chap. 8, for an excellent summary of this 
literature), and demonstrate how a bargaining association can lead to efficiency gains. 
The final section concludes and discusses the empirical implications of our model.  
 
Bargaining in Agricultural Markets 
Our intent in this section is not to provide an exhaustive overview of agricultural 
bargaining but rather to point out ways in which descriptions of the institutional features 
of bargaining associations seem consistent with the notion that bargaining can have 
efficiency consequences.  
To begin, it is noteworthy that bargaining occurs primarily in markets for processing 
fruits and vegetables. This particular set of markets comprises only a small portion of all 
agricultural markets, and it is natural to ask why bargaining associations aren’t more 
widespread. If the success of bargaining as an institution hinges on delivering higher 
prices to growers, we should expect to observe bargaining in a larger class of 
commodities. At least two features of markets for processing fruits and vegetables seem 
relevant to this point. First, processors obtain their output primarily through forward 
contracts, so that traditional modes of price discovery are absent. Moreover, procurement 
decisions are typically made in the context of uncertainty about the state of future 
demand (e.g., prior to planting). To the extent that price negotiations during bargaining 
facilitate industry-wide communication about future demand, bargaining can thus be 
viewed as a sort of indirect price discovery mechanism. Second, processing of fruits and 
vegetables is highly concentrated (both spatially and in numbers of firms), so that it is 
reasonable to expect some degree of oligopoly behavior by firms. This fact possibly 
increases the potential benefits of collective bargaining and (spatial concentration) 
reduces organizational and communication costs among growers. Although the efficiency 
consequences of bargaining in the context of oligopolistic markets are not immediately 
apparent, in the next section we show how centralized price discovery (or “information 
sharing”) effectively increases competition among oligopsony buyers, thus leading to a 
more efficient outcome.1 
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Results and discussion from two studies of bargaining seem consistent with the 
notion that bargaining is more than simply “price enhancement.” First, in a national 
survey of (processing) fruit and vegetable bargaining associations, Iskow and Sexton 
(1992) note that “the majority of associations felt their role was not only to improve the 
well-being of grower-members, but also to provide services to processors.” Of the 
services provided, “increased price stability,” “improved information,” and “improved 
price discovery process” were mostly frequently cited.2 Lacking similar responses from 
processing firms, it is difficult to know whether in fact such services are provided and 
valued. Nevertheless, the fact that nearly all respondents view price discovery and 
improved information as important services provided by their respective associations is 
certainly consistent with the hypothesis that “bargaining” can increase efficiency.  
Bunje (1980) offers a comprehensive description of bargaining in U.S. agricultural 
markets;3 in summarizing the role of farm bargaining he similarly notes: 
 
Bargaining associations can fill the needs of the market as well as the needs of the 
individual producer. They can serve a supply coordinating function for the market and 
furnish market intelligence for the producer. They can operate as a price discovery 
vehicle, establish market prices, and establish uniform terms of trade that serve the 
producer and the marketplace.  
 
While such a quote might be viewed as self-serving coming from a representative of 
bargaining associations, it again conveys the idea that, at least in the minds of those who 
operate bargaining associations, bargaining can lead to efficiency gains.  
In what follows, we formally analyze one possible source of such a gain. We develop 
an oligopoly model of n firms who produce substitute final goods, and who obtain their 
raw farm input from a group of homogeneous growers (represented by an aggregate 
supply relation). Before procurement, each firm is uncertain about the true state of future 
demand but receives an imperfect signal of demand. We study private incentives for 
firms to share (or pool) their signals, and the corresponding welfare implications. In this 
context, we interpret the intensive communication that occurs during the annual 
bargaining process as a means of implementing information sharing.  
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Model 
The Setup 
There are n firms who convert farm output into a vector of final consumption goods 
q = (q1, …, qn), where qi represent the quantity of final goods sold by firm i. For 
simplicity, we suppose that each firm transforms qi into final output in Leontief fashion 
with constant marginal cost (normalized to zero), and moreover that a single unit of farm 
output yields a single unit of final output. Thus, for given output price pi(q), and farm 
price r(q), firm i’s profits are given by P(qi, q-i ) = [pi(q) – r(q)]qi, where q–i represents 
the n – 1 vector of outputs other than i’s. Growers are represented by an aggregate 
(inverse) supply function r = a + bQ, where 
1
n
ii
Q q
=
= å  is the aggregate quantity of farm 
output purchased.4  
Final goods are differentiated and valued by a representative consumer with utility 
function  
 2
1 1
1
( ) ( ) 2 ,
2
n n
i i i j
i i i j
U q q q q q
= = ¹
æ ö
= a + e - b + gç ÷
è ø
å å å  (1) 
where b  > g  > 0, a  > 0, and where e is a normally distributed, aggregate source of 
uncertainty. We suppose that all firms share a common prior of 0 for the mean of this 
random variable, and that its variance, se, is known. For a given vector of prices p = (p1, 
…, pn), consumers choose quantities to maximize U(q) – 1 ,
n
i ii
p q
=å , yielding inverse 
demand schedules for each firm’s output given by 
 pi(qi, q–i) = a  + e – b qi – .j
j i
q
¹
gå  (2) 
The timing of actions in our model is as follows. In period 0, each firm receives an 
independent (and private) signal si = e + ni , where ni is distributed normally and 
independently of e with E[ni] = 0, E[ 2in ] = sn, E[ninj ] = 0 for i ¹ j. Thus, each si 
represents imperfect, though unbiased, information on the state of future demand. Based 
on these signals, firms form expectations in period 1 about demand in period 2 and 
coordinate with growers for delivery of some quantity of farm output that arrives in 
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period 2. Expectations depend on the information available to each firm, and we consider 
two scenarios. In the first, each firm keeps its information private and thus forms an 
expectation based on si (for firm i). Alternatively, firms pool their information and thus 
form expectations based on the full vector of signals s = (s1, …, sn). Finally, in period 2, 
firms noncooperatively choose prices to maximize their individual profit, given the 
quantities of output arranged for delivery in the previous period. We assume “efficient 
rationing” (e.g., Tirole 1989) of quantities, so that equilibrium prices in period 2 are just 
those that form an equilibrium when all quantities are delivered to the market.  
The structure of this market is analogous to Bertrand competitors choosing capacities 
in an ex ante period, where here “capacities” are given by the quantity of output arranged 
for delivery during period 1. For the equilibrium we described above, it is, of course, 
essential that no firm can obtain additional output in period 2 (relative to what was 
arranged for delivery during period 1). This is a natural feature of the markets we study 
given the time interval required to produce most kinds of farm output.5  
Market Equilibrium Without Information Sharing 
In period 1, after each firm receives its signal si, the firms play a Cournot game in 
choosing quantities of output for delivery in period 2. For given qi, the (conditional) 
expected profit of firm i is given by 
 ( , | ) [ | ] [ | ]i i i i i j i i
j i
q q s E s q E q s q-
¹
æ ö
P = a + e - b - gç ÷
è ø
å  (3) 
where a = a – a, b = b + b, and g = g  + b. Let r = se/( se + sn) represent the correlation 
between si and sj. Then firms update their priors on e with the formula E[e|si] = rsi, which 
is a (variance) weighted average of the prior and si. Firm i’s reaction function is then 
given by  
 
[ | ]
( )
2
i j ij i
i i
s E q s
q q ¹-
a + r - g
=
b
å
. (4) 
To find an equilibrium for this game, we suppose that firms use strategies that are 
affine in their signals and we then verify that these strategies indeed form an equilibrium. 
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Letting firm i’s equilibrium strategy be given by qi = c0 + c1 si , and noting that E[sj|si] = 
rsi, it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium is obtained setting c0 = a/d, and c1 = 
r/dr , where d = 2b + (n – 1)g, and dr = 2b + (n – 1)gr, and hence that the equilibrium 
quantity for firm i is given by 
 p ii
s
q
r
a r
= +
d d
. (5) 
For future reference, we note that E[ piq ] = a/d, E[(
p
iq )
2] = E[ piq ]
2 + ser/ 2 ,rd  and 
E[ p pi jq q ] = E[
p
iq ]
2 + 2es r /
2 ,rd  for i ¹ j.  
The full information equilibrium level of production (when a is known for certain) is 
given by a/d, so that firms increase or decrease their output relative to this benchmark 
depending on whether the realization of si is greater than or less than zero. The variance 
of signal noise sn has an ambiguous effect on the slope term r/dr. On the one hand, as sn 
decreases, firms put more weight on their signals relative to their prior, and this makes 
firms more responsive. This effect is reflected in the numerator of the second term in 
equation (5) where a decrease in sn increases r. However, a decrease in sn also increases 
the correlation of the firms’ signals. This in turn implies that if some firm, say firm i, 
receives information suggesting high demand, it is likely that other firms have received 
similar information. Because the outputs of each firm are substitutes, an equilibrium 
response to this is a reduction in firm i’s output. This effect is reflected in the 
denominator, where a decrease in sn increases dr. Changes in se have a similarly 
ambiguous, though reciprocal, effect on firm responsiveness. A reduction in se lowers the 
weight placed on each firm’s signal, making firms less responsive, but also reduces the 
correlation of signals, and this tends to increase responsiveness.  
Expected profit for each firm prior to observing their signal si, but anticipating 
equilibrium behavior for any realization of s, is given by  
 max ( , | )
i
p i i iq
E q q s-
é ùP = Pê úë û
 (6) 
which from (4) reduces to 2[( ) ].pp iE qP = b  Direct calculation from (5) then yields  
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2
2 2p
e
r
a s r
P = +
d d
. (7) 
The first term in this expression represents the profits each firm would receive if 
there were no uncertainty (se = 0). From this term, expected profits are high when 
aggregate demand and supply are high (high a  or low a), or when the total price 
decrease resulting from a small increase in each firm’s output is small (low d). 
One consequence of information sharing is an increase in the precision with which 
firms estimate e. Thus, before considering the market equilibrium with information 
sharing, it is natural to consider how a reduction in the variance of the signal error sn 
(which reduces the variance of each firm’s estimate of e) affects expected firm profits 
when there is no information sharing. From (7), a reduction in sn has a similar qualitative 
effect on profits as on the equilibrium responsiveness of each firm’s output to their signal 
(previously described). Firms benefit from a reduction in the variance of signal noise 
because their output decision more accurately reflects actual demand conditions. 
However, because the signals of each firm become more correlated, equilibrium outputs 
also have greater correlation, and this tends to reduce expected profits. Thus, whether or 
not firms gain from information sharing generally will depend on a direct comparison of 
expected profits in each regime. In the next section, we derive an expression for expected 
firm profits when information is shared and make this comparison.  
Market Equilibrium With Full Information Sharing  
Here we suppose that some mechanism is available for firms to share their 
information. Later in the paper, we’ll argue that a bargaining association can be one such 
mechanism. To focus on the potential benefits from information sharing, we continue to 
assume that firms act as oligopsonists in the market for farm output.6  
When information sharing occurs, firms receive the full vector of signals s and thus 
form common estimates of e. With n independent signals, the best estimate of e is given 
by E[e|s] = rn s , where rn = nse/(nse + sn), and s  is the mean value of the vector s. 
Proceeding as in the previous section, firm i’s reaction function is then given by  
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[ | ]
( )
2
n jj i
i i
s E q s
q q ¹-
a + r - g
=
b
å
, (8) 
yielding the equilibrium quantity  
 s ni
s
q
a + r
=
d
, (9) 
with E[ siq ] = E[
p
iq ] = a/d, and E[(
s
iq )
2] = E[ s si jq q ] = E[
s
iq ]
2 + sern/d2. 
Thus, equilibrium expected output is the same regardless of whether or not firms 
share information about their common demand uncertainty. Firms are more responsive to 
their aggregate signal s  than to their private signal si when  
 rn/r ³ d/dr, (10) 
and it is straightforward to verify that this condition is always satisfied (for b > g). Thus, 
the greater precision of the firms’ estimate of e, and the corresponding increase in 
responsiveness (measured by the term on the left-hand side of the above inequality), 
outweighs the reduction in responsiveness associated with increased (perfect) correlation 
among the firms’ signals (measured by the right-hand side of the inequality). Expected 
firm profits with information sharing are given by  
 
2
2 2
n
s
ea s rP = +
d d
, (11) 
and are thus higher than without information sharing when  
 2 2/ /n rr r ³ d d . (12) 
The following proposition summarizes the conditions under which information 
sharing leads to higher expected firm profits. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Information sharing increases expected firm profits when outputs are 
sufficiently differentiated and when aggregate farm supply is sufficiently elastic (for a 
given total quantity).  
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Intuitively, a high degree of product differentiation is analogous to each firm acting 
as a monopolist in the downstream market for farm output. Improved information on 
future demand increases each firm’s ability to price discriminate, and this in turn 
increases expected profitability. Similarly, when supply is sufficiently elastic, 
procurement decisions have a relatively small effect on the upstream price of farm output, 
and this also enhances expected profitability with information sharing. For the reasons 
discussed earlier, the magnitude of ex ante uncertainty se and variance of signal noise sn 
have ambiguous effects on the expected profitability of information sharing.  
Welfare Comparison 
In this section, we evaluate the effect of information sharing on total expected 
welfare and on the expected welfare of consumers and growers individually. We evaluate 
ex ante welfare (prior to the firms receiving their signals) but suppose, as in the previous 
section, that firms anticipate the equilibrium that will obtain in either scenario and for a 
given realization of s.  
Surplus for growers is given by 212 2( ( ) ) ,br Q a Q Q- =  so that expected grower 
surplus is given by  
 ( )2[ ] ( 1) [ ]
2 i i j
nb
E q n E q q+ - . (13) 
Using the expressions for E[ 2iq ] and E[qiqj] obtained in the previous sections, it is 
straightforward to verify that growers always benefit from information sharing. 
Intuitively, both growers and firms gain from increased precision in estimating aggregate 
demand. However, the increase in correlation among firms’ outputs lowers expected firm 
profits, and increases expected grower surplus. Thus, the two effects associated with 
information sharing—increased precision in estimating aggregate demand and increased 
correlation among firms’ outputs—are countervailing with respect to firm profits but 
complementary with respect to grower surplus.  
Consumer surplus is given by 
1
( ) .
n
i ii
U q p q
=
- å  Taking expectations (assuming 
equilibrium behavior by firms) yields 
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 ( )2[ ] ( 1) [ ] .
2 i i j
n
E q n E q qb + - g  (14) 
Thus, consumers also benefit from the correlation among firms’ outputs, but only when 
there is some degree of product substitutability. As with grower surplus, the effects of 
information sharing on consumer surplus tend to complement, though to a lesser degree 
since E[qiqj] is weighted by g  < b . Using the expressions for E[ 2iq ] and E[qiqj] from the 
previous section, consumers gain from information sharing whenever  
 
2
2
( ( 1) )
.
( ( 1) )
n n
nr
r d b + - gr
³
r d b + - g
  (15) 
Because r < 1, if information sharing leads to higher expected profits, then expected 
consumer surplus also increases. When b = 0, this inequality will always be satisfied 
since d = b  + (n – 1) g  and dr = b  + (n – 1) g r. For b > 0, condition (15) will generally 
hold but can be violated. Thus, consumers generally gain from information sharing, 
though we cannot rule out the possibility that expected consumer surplus falls. Adding up 
the expected surplus measures for each party, total expected surplus is given by 
 ( )23 [ ] ( 1) [ ] ,
2 i i j
n
E q n E q qb + - g  (16) 
and is greater when information is shared if  
 
2
2
(3 ( 1) )
.
(3 ( 1) )
n n
nr
r d b + - gr
³
r d b + - g
 (17) 
As with consumer surplus, we cannot rule out the possibility that expected total surplus 
falls with information sharing, though in general it seems difficult to violate the 
inequality in (17).  
The following proposition summarizes the effects of information sharing on the 
grower, the consumer, and the total surplus.  
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PROPOSITION 2. Information sharing always benefits growers. Expected consumer surplus 
and total surplus increase whenever expected firm profits increase and may increase 
even as expected firm profits fall.  
Because the expressions for changes in expected profit and consumer surplus resulting 
from information sharing yield ambiguous results, we evaluate these measures (and 
expected grower surplus) for a particular specification of our model. We set n = 5, a  = 1, 
b  = 0.3, a = 0, b = 0.1, se = 0.3, and sn = 0.1. With this specification, we then let g  
range from 0 to b  and evaluate differences in expected surplus with and without 
information sharing. The results are displayed in Figure 1. When outputs are sufficiently 
substitutable, expected firm profits fall when information is shared, though by a relatively 
small amount. Growers gain most from information sharing when outputs are highly  
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FIGURE 1. Difference in expected surplus with and without information sharing as 
firm outputs become increasingly substitutable in consumer preferences 
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differentiated. Interestingly, the change in expected consumer surplus with information  
sharing is initially increasing with the degree of product substitutability, then decreasing.  
Figure 2 displays the results of a similar comparative static, but where we hold g  
constant at 0.05 and let n range between 2 and 10 firms. Again, information sharing leads 
to a decrease in expected firm profits but now for n sufficiently large. Information 
sharing benefits growers (and, to a lesser degree, consumers) by a larger amount, as the 
number of firms increase.  
Though not reported, a decrease in b (making supply more elastic for any given 
quantity of aggregate output) increases expected consumer surplus with information 
sharing and reduces expected surplus for growers. In all cases analyzed, expected total 
surplus increases from information sharing, and the benefit to firms is relatively small 
(and sometimes negative). It is also noteworthy that growers seem to gain substantially  
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FIGURE 2. Difference in expected surplus with and without information sharing as 
the number of firms increases 
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from information sharing relative to firms, thus adding further potential benefit from 
bargaining beyond what might be achieved through changes in market structure (e.g., 
more competitive pricing of farm output; see endnote 6).  
Private Incentives to Reveal Information and the Role of Bargaining Associations 
We have seen that information exchange among firms can lead to a market 
equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium with no information exchange;  
however, it turns out that when we examine each firm’s private incentive to share 
information, a firm increases its expected profits by not reporting, given that all other 
firms have reported truthfully. More formally, suppose that firms play a two-stage game 
in which each firm can truthfully report its signal or report nothing in the first stage, and 
then firms choose quantities and prices noncooperatively in the second stage, conditional 
on equilibrium reports in the first stage. The following proposition (from Raith 1996) 
summarizes the first-stage equilibrium of this game.  
PROPOSITION 3. In the two-stage game in which firms first decide whether or not to report 
their signal to other firms and then choose quantities and prices noncooperatively 
(conditional on the vector of equilibrium first-stage reports), each firm’s dominant 
equilibrium first-stage strategy is to not report its signal.  
In other words, given that all firms j ¹ i report their signals truthfully, firm i gains by 
deviating and reporting nothing. Intuitively, given that all other firms report their signals, 
firm i obtains the full benefits from increased precision in estimating aggregate demand 
and, by withholding its signal, reduces the correlation among equilibrium outputs. This 
unambiguously raises expected profits for firm i, relative to the equilibrium in which it 
also reports its signal.  
Thus, firms potentially face a prisoner’s dilemma in which all parties gain from 
information sharing but equilibrium behavior is to not share. Moreover, as we’ve seen in 
the previous section, this equilibrium generally leads to lower welfare for consumers and 
growers. It is thus natural to consider the kinds of institutions that might lead to an 
efficient outcome. Vives (1990) and Kirby (1988) suggest that “trade associations” are 
such an institution in markets where firms’ outputs are strategic complements. With 
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strategic complementarity, information sharing unambiguously increases expected firm 
profits, and it is a dominant strategy for firms to report their information. Thus, by 
collecting industry-wide information and reporting aggregate statistics, it is argued that 
these associations effectively implement an information-sharing outcome.  
However, it is important to recognize that implementing the sharing outcome from 
the earlier section requires a highly detailed information-gathering effort by the 
association, even when firm outputs are strategic complements. In particular, we noted 
earlier that firms’ reports of their signals must be verifiable in the sense that firms are 
unable to misreport their signals (though they can choose to not report at all). Ziv (1993) 
studies information sharing when firms can strategically distort their signals and finds 
that firms always will choose to report nontruthfully. Thus, in practice, verifiability is 
likely to be a substantial informational barrier, and it is not clear from existing theoretical 
work whether trade associations actually overcome this barrier or whether their primary 
service is on other dimensions (e.g., lobbying and promotional activities).  
In the context of agricultural markets, bargaining associations represent a mechanism 
for sharing and verifying information among firms. The annual price negotiation that 
occurs with bargaining is an opportunity for explicit consideration of future demand 
conditions (perhaps even the primary activity) and is arguably a much more intensive 
information-gathering effort than is the reporting of aggregate industry conditions (as a 
trade association might do). Moreover, the structure of bargaining legislation effectively 
forces information revelation, since firms are required to engage in price negotiation. 
Thus, even when it is privately rational for firms to not report their information, or to 
misreport, bargaining may effectively force (truthful) information sharing. As we’ve 
seen, in some markets this will lead to an ex ante Pareto improvement, while in others, 
firms may collectively receive lower expected profits.  
It is not immediately clear how to test whether bargaining associations are indeed 
playing this role, but the model presented above is suggestive. Suppose we take as the 
null hypothesis that the primary role of bargaining is price enhancement for growers. In 
principle, we could identify differences in the predictions of such a model (regarding the 
conditions that are conducive to the formation of bargaining associations) with those of 
the information-sharing model and examine which set of predictions best explains the 
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incidence of bargaining associations across commodities and regions or whether 
predictions associated with information sharing add explanatory power. The key 
difference in these alternative explanations of bargaining lies in the potential gain for 
firms from information sharing. If information sharing were important, then, ceteris 
paribus, we’d expect bargaining to emerge if its effect on expected firm profits is 
relatively large (positive, or not too negative). In contrast, if price enhancement were the 
primary function of bargaining associations, then we’d expect the effect of bargaining on 
firm profits to be less important in explaining the incidence of bargaining.  
 
Conclusion 
We provide a rationale for the existence of bargaining associations in agricultural 
markets that is entirely independent of the role they may play in countervailing market 
power. In markets with a large proportion of “contracted” production, and a 
corresponding absence of spot markets, traditional modes of price discovery are absent. 
One possible substitute for price discovery via markets is direct communication among 
competing firms concerning expected future supply and demand conditions (prior to the 
annual procurement decision). In the spirit of work by Vives (1984), Li (1985), and Raith 
(1996), we model this communication as a Bayesian game among oligopolists in which 
each of n firms receives a signal of future demand (for simplicity we ignore supply 
uncertainty) and evaluate the welfare implications of firms sharing their respective 
signals with other firms. Information sharing tends to benefit consumers and growers but 
to have ambiguous consequences for expected firm profits. Information sharing allows 
firms to increase the precision of estimated future demand, but because the signals are 
positively correlated (a natural assumption, given the nature of the markets we study), 
information sharing also tends to increase the correlation among firms’ equilibrium 
strategies. In markets where final outputs are substitutes, firm strategies are strategic 
substitutes, so that a positive correlation of strategies reduces expected profit. Thus, the 
effects of information sharing tend to countervail with respect to expected profits, and to 
complement with respect to consumer and grower surplus.  
Even when expected profits for firms increase because of information sharing, firms 
face a prisoner’s dilemma in which the equilibrium behavior of each firm is to not report 
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its information (not reporting when other firms report reduces the correlation of 
strategies, with no effect on the precision of estimated future demand). We argue that 
collective bargaining represents one possible means of overcoming this equilibrium and, 
more generally, of increasing expected total welfare. 
  
 
 
Endnotes 
1.  Of course, if information sharing leads to a collusive outcome, efficiency may be 
reduced. Though it may be in the interest of both processors and growers to 
collusively set output, it is doubtful that in practice such an outcome can be sustained. 
As we’ll demonstrate, information sharing without collusion generally leads to higher 
expected surplus for consumers and growers (even when growers do not have 
countervailing market power), and possibly even higher expected profits for firms.  
 
2.  Of the 36 associations sampled, 31 cited increased price stability, 32 cited improved 
information, and 25 cited improved price discovery. When queried about services 
offered to growers, only “price negotiation” and “time and method of payment” were 
similarly cited by more than 30 associations.  
 
3. Ralph Bunje was a leading spokesman and proponent of farm bargaining for over 30 
years during his tenure as manager of the California Canning Peach Association (see 
forward in Bunje 1980).  
 
4. This specification of the farm sector ignores grower heterogeneity, which may be 
important in considering the incentives for growers to form a bargaining association. 
We’d like to consider the industry-wide incentives to form a bargaining association, 
independent of the organizational and administrative difficulties created by grower 
heterogeneity.  
 
5.  It is also worth noting that we take as a given each firm’s desire to coordinate with 
growers in period 1 (rather than to compete for aggregate output in period 2). This is 
consistent with the notion that firms “contract” with growers, rather than purchasing 
output on some kind of spot market. Understanding why firms choose to contract is 
an interesting question, but one that lies beyond the scope of this paper. Interestingly, 
as noted in the previous section, the absence of spot markets (and the corresponding 
prevalence of contracted arrangements) seems to be a necessary condition for the 
establishment of bargaining associations.  
 
6.  Bargaining that leads to competitive pricing for farm output would, of course, 
generate efficiency gains, but we’d like to evaluate the benefits from information 
sharing independent of changes in market structure.  
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